The split-S system and the source of the absolutive case in Tenetehára

The main goal of this paper is to investigate the split-S system in Tenetehára. I propose that the A and Sa subjects are cross-referenced by means of the same set of prefixes in root eventive clauses, whereas O and So are encoded by the absolutive clitics. The analysis demonstrates that this language exhibits an internal parametric variation in the sense that the Sa, So and A subjects may receive either the nominative or accusative Case, whereas objects systematically receive the accusative Case. This opens a parametric option in the sense that a higher functional projection must be activated in order to make possible the Case evaluation of the Sa, So, A and O arguments.  ---DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31513/linguistica.2017.v13n2a14034The main goal of this paper is to investigate the split-S system in Tenetehára. I propose that the A and Sa subjects are cross-referenced by means of the same set of prefixes in root eventive clauses, whereas O and So are encoded by the absolutive clitics. The analysis demonstrates that this language exhibits an internal parametric variation in the sense that the Sa, So and A subjects may receive either the nominative or accusative Case, whereas objects systematically receive the accusative Case. This opens a parametric option in the sense that a higher functional projection must be activated in order to make possible the Case evaluation of the Sa, So, A and O arguments.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Este artigo examina o sistema cindido de marcação de argumentos nucleares na língua Tenetehára. Propõe-se que há uma série de prefixos que codifica os argumentos A e Sa de predicados eventivos, enquanto outra série codifica os argumentos O e So por meio de clíticos absolutivos. A análise propõe ainda que essa língua exibe uma variação paramétrica, visto que os sujeitos Sa, So, e A ora recebem Caso nominativo ora Caso acusativo, enquanto objetos recebem apenas Caso acusativo. Esta proposta abre uma opção paramétrica no sentido de que precisamos acionar uma projeção funcional acima do domínio de v-VP para possibilitar a valoração de Caso dos argumentos Sa, So, A e O. ---DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31513/linguistica.2017.v13n2a1403

The role of collateral and relationship lending in loan pricing: evidence from United Kingdom SMEs

This study investigates how the use of collateral affects the incentives of borrowers, lenders and the relationship between them in loan pricing. Using the UK Survey of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 2008, the results from a simultaneous equation approach show that high quality borrowers choose a contract with more collateral and lower interest rate, suggesting that collateral acts as an incentive device to adverse selection problem in credit markets. By distinguish business and personal collateral the findings suggest that personal collateral seems to be more effective in acting as a sorting device in line with screening models. Regarding the nature borrower-lender relationship the results also show a substitution effect between relationship length and collateral requirements from the main bank. But the main bank uses explicit loan interest rate as a loss leader to secure long-term rents on relationship business, suggesting that inter-temporal shifting rents is possible

Netodyssey: a framework for real-time windowed analysis of network traffic

Traffic monitoring and analysis is of critical importance for managing and designing modern computer networks, and constitutes nowadays a very active research field. In most of their studies, researchers use techniques and tools that follow a statistical approach to obtain a deeper knowledge about the traffic behaviour. Network administrators also find great value in statistical analysis tools. Many of those tools return similar metrics calculated for common properties of network packets. This dissertation presents NetOdyssey, a framework for the statistical analysis of network traffic. One of the crucial points of differentiation of NetOdyssey from other analysis frameworks is the windowed analysis philosophy behind NetOdyssey. This windowed analysis philosophy allows researchers who seek for a deeper knowledge about networks, to look at traffic as if looking through a window. This approach is crucial in order to avoid the biasing effects of statistically looking at the traffic as a whole. Small fluctuations and irregularities in the network can now be analyzed, because one is always looking through window which has a fixed size: either in number of observations or in the temporal duration of those observations. NetOdyssey is able to capture live traffic from a network card or from a pre-collected trace, thus allowing for real-time analysis or delayed and repetitive analysis. NetOdyssey has a modular architecture making it possible for researchers with reduced programming capabilities to create analysis modules which can be tweaked and easily shared among those who utilize this framework. These modules were thought so that their implementation is optimized according to the windowed analysis philosophy behind NetOdyssey. This optimization makes the analysis process independent from the size of the analysis window, because it only contemplates the observations coming in and going out of this window. Besides presenting this framework, its architecture and validation, the present Dissertation also presents four different analysis modules: Average and Standard deviation, Entropy, Auto-Correlation and Hurst Parameter estimators. Each of this modules is presented and validated throughout the present dissertation.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT

Essays on banking credit acquisition : evidences from SMEs operating in adverse context: collateralization, mutual guarantees and borrowing discouragement

This thesis consists in four papers addressing the difficulties of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) when accessing banking finance in a context of high informational asymmetries , during a period of financial crisis and adjustments of the banking capital ratios. A central characteristic of SMEs is their dependence on bank credit for external financing (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Asymmetric information and agency costs, however, underlie the inadequate financing of these firms. Previous studies show that, due to the lack of information on individual borrowers, banks issue restrictive loan term contracts to reduce their default exposure. Banks can cause the interest rate to become inefficiently high such that worthy firms are driven out of the credit market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Alternatively, firms with negative net present value projects could obtain financial support in the credit market by taking advantage of cross-subsidization of borrowers with worthy projects (Mankiw, 1986; De Meza and Webb, 1987). In both cases, the reason for market failure is that banks are unable to assess the actual riskiness of SMEs and are forced to offer the same contract to them with a different probability of success. Hence, to overcome screening errors, lenders may reject part of a firm´s loan request (i.e., type I rationing) or simply turn down the credit (i.e., type II rationing) (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009a). Recent studies show that when borrowers’ wealth is large enough, banks may bypass informational asymmetries by offering a menu of contracts with collateral requirements which, acting as a sorting device, mitigates the screening errors and the credit rationing for good firms. In this case, risky borrowers will be self-selected by choosing contracts with high repayment (i.e., high interest rates) and low collateral, while safe borrowers will choose contracts with high collateral and low repayment (Han et al., 2009a). Thus, in the design of loan term contracts, collateral assumes a key role as a risk management instrument (Bonfim, 2005). Its role, however, has been little studied in the field of entrepreneurial finance and has been validated, particularly, in the context of a market-based system that gives to SMEs a wider range of funding sources (La Porta et al., 1998). Furthermore, it seems entirely plausible that the role of collateral differs within developed and less developed countries (Menkhoff et al., 2012), surrounded by different levels of informational asymmetries (Hainz, 2003; Beck et al., 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006), and that their efficiency depends on its nature (i.e., business versus personal collateral – Mann, 1997b). The features of collateral also depend on the characteristics of the individual loan and the firm (Berger and Udell, 1998; Columba et al., 2010) as well as the legal procedures for loan recovery (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009). If SMEs are unable to post collateral while they have a short credit history, meet less rigorous reporting requirements and the availability of public information is scarce (Columba et al., 2010) or if the legal system is inadequate to protect creditor rights (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009), their access to bank credit would remain restricted especially during economic downturns, with negative effects on industry Dynamics competitiveness and growth (Beck and Demirgüc- Kunt, 2006). In this context, in almost half of countries around the world several types of loan guarantee funds have been created to help SMEs to gain easier access to the credit market (Green, 2003; Gonzàles et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2010; Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010). The importance of mutual guarantee schemes (MGS) is destined to further increase in the light of the Basel II and III Capital Accords which state that the guarantees of such institutions can, if granted in compliance with some requirements, allow banks to mitigate credit risk with small business lending, and thus, save regulatory capital (SPGM, 2007; Cardone-Riportella et al. 2008). In the recent years, the allocation of mutual guarantees gained a momentum, especially in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Since the onset of the crisis in the international financial sector, MGS have been the privileged instrument to extend credit for SMEs without compromising the capital requirements of banks (Uesugi et al, 2010). However, the question whether third-party guarantee is an effective instrument to promote lending to SMEs is a controversial issue in both academic and policy literature (Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010; Boschi et al., 2014). Traditionally, practitioners and policy makers have been concentrating much of their attention in those firms that apply for bank credit and specifically on the credit rationing problem, marginalizing those firms which do not apply for loans, even when they need external financing. These firms are the so-called “discouraged borrowers” (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002). Although the theoretical model of Kon and Storey (2003) for “discouragement” is, in principle, applicable to both developed and less developed economies, it is expected that discouragement is higher in less developed countries due to lower business traceability (e.g., Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Brown et al., 2011; Cole and Dietrich, 2012). Empirical literature on the discouragement problem in less developed countries is, however, limited providing a fertile ground for the study of the causes for the existence of discouraged borrowers. Based on this theoretical and empirical framework, this thesis critically approaches underexplored dimensions of banking lending activity targeted to SMEs financing, such as: the collateralization policy; the role of mutual guarantees; and the discouraged demand for credit. In the first chapter we examine the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information on SMEs´ loan contracts, using data from a major commercial bank operating in Portugal, gathered between January 2007 and December 2010. Using a multiperiod setting, this paper provides the first analysis of the sorting by signalling and self-selection (SBSS) model in a bank-based system. Furthermore, this chapter provides empirical evidence of the effect of macroeconomic conditions on loan contracts during credit crunch and recession periods. Using 12,666 credit approvals, the main results show that borrowers with good credit scores and a high probability of success as they are unlikely to default, are more willing to pledge collateral in return for lower interest rate premium (IRP). In an interactive and sequential event, we confirm that lenders tailor the specific terms of the contract, based on the observable characteristics, increasing both collateral requirements and IRP, for observed risky borrowers, in line with Han et al (2009a)´s SBSS model. However, we reject the positive effect of loan size, predicted by the SBSS model, in terms of loan price negotiation. We argue that loan size decreases the probability of collateralization and the loan interest rates, suggesting that larger loans increase the potential payoff for banks and are assigned to borrowers with good observable characteristics. As loan maturity increases, in contrast, the lender is more likely to demand collateralization and IRP, especially if the borrower is bad or unobservably good, in line with moral hazard arguments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Boot et al., 1991). This paper shows that our findings are robust when we predict the degree of collateralization offered by the borrower, adding strength to the SBSS model and contributing to overcome its empirical gaps underlined by Lambrecht (2009). The second chapter scrutinizes the role of mutual guarantees in Portuguese bank lending activity. Using data provided by the same bank, covering 11,181 loans granted to SMEs between January 2008 and December 2010, this paper provides the first appraisal of Portuguese MGS in response to the financial crisis. We examine the characteristics of firms benefiting from mutual guaranteed loans and analyzes the impact of mutual guarantees in loan pricing as well as on the ex-post performance of borrowers. The findings provide a comprehensive insight confirming the value of mutual guarantees to improve Portuguese banking loan activity, especially for good SMEs operating in a stressful context, reducing the costs of borrowing and improving the ex post default of borrowers. Thus, we suggest that mutual guarantees could be used to raise the loan´s recovery rate allowing banks to meet their commitments with banking regulation and supervision in the context of financial crisis. We also argue that these effects are especially noticeable by combining third-party guarantees and collateral. The third chapter extends the empirical evidences on the determinants of the collateral in loan contract terms in countries characterized by low informational traceability and low creditor protection. It uses the fourth-round database of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) carried out between 2007 and 2009, covering 3,403 ultimately banking credit approvals for SMEs, operating in Eastern European and Central Asia less developed countries. This paper examines the incidence of business and personal collateral and its level reporting first-hand evidence regarding the impact of the recently reformed credit environment on collateral requirements. The findings endorse the importance in producing and sharing private information between lenders to reduce informational asymmetries and consequently the need to provide collateral to receive a loan. Moreover, we find that market concentration increases banks´ lazy-behavior by asking for collateral not to mitigate observable risk but to reduce screening efforts. We also prove that reforms around the depth of information-sharing instruments by public credit registries only have practical effects mitigating credit constraints and reducing the collateral requirements when coupled with public reforms on its coverage. In addition, this chapter shows that business and personal collateral have distinctive values addressing moral hazard and adverse selection problems, especially relevant in the context under study, advising caution on the practitioners’ extrapolations when modeling the determinants of bank loans collateralization. The fourth chapter examines the conditions that favor the existence of discouraged borrowers, using data provided by the fourth-round of the BEEPS. This paper selects 6,307 loan seekers, among which 2,207 SMEs are typed as discouraged borrowers and 4,280 are classified as loan applicants. We prove that whereas the firm´s opaqueness, demographic issues and distance between borrower and lender better explains the discouragement by tough loan price and/or loan application procedures, the firm´s risk and the banking concentration explains the incidence of discouraged borrowers by fear of rationing. Nonetheless, we argue that in a higher concentrated banking system, those firms with a closer and more intensive relationship with the bank are more likely discouraged to apply for a loan than distant borrowers. This is reasonable if we assume that these firms are more likely to rely on banks as their primordial source of finance, getting locked by the superior bargaining power of the credit provider in a context of low competition (Sharpe, 1991; Detragiache et al. 2000). In turn, this bargaining power may discourage the business to apply for new loans. The innovator status, the legal protection of borrowers and lenders in a default event and the coverage of information sharing instruments help to explain the discouragement in a transversal way.Esta tese é composta por quatro artigos que abordam as dificuldades enfrentadas pelas Pequenas e Médias Empresas (PMEs) no acesso ao financiamento bancário num contexto de elevada assimetria de informação e/ou reduzida rastreabilidade de informação, durante um período de crise financeira e de ajustamentos nos rácios de capital do sector bancário. Uma das características centrais das PMEs é a sua dependência do crédito bancário no que diz respeito ao seu financiamento externo (Degryse e Van Cayseele, 2000), sendo frequentemente atribuídas as suas fragilidades no acesso a fontes externas de capital, maioritariamente dívida bancária, à assimetria de informação e aos custos de agência. A literatura evidencia que, devido à falta de informação sobre os mutuários, os bancos emitem contratos de empréstimo com cláusulas restritivas para reduzir a sua exposição ao risco e ao incumprimento. Os bancos tendem a exigir, por exemplo, taxas de juro tão elevadas que afastam empresas sustentáveis e saudáveis do mercado de crédito (Stiglitz e Weiss, 1981). Em alternativa, as empresas com projetos de valor atual líquido (VAL) negativo poderão obter apoio financeiro, no mercado de crédito bancário, aproveitando a subsidiação cruzada dos mutuários com projetos viáveis (Mankiw, 1986; De Meza e Webb, 1987). Em ambos os casos, a origem destas imperfeições de mercado reside na incapacidade dos bancos avaliarem corretamente o grau de risco efetivo das PMEs, e dos seus projetos, sendo forçados a oferecer o mesmo contrato para empresas com probabilidade de sucesso distintas. Assim, com o objetivo de mitigar os erros na triagem dos diferentes projetos, os credores podem ser levados a racionar o montante dos empréstimos a conceder a essas empresas (i.e., racionamento de tipo I) ou simplesmente a rejeitar o pedido de crédito (i.e., racionamento de tipo II) (Steijvers e Voordeckers, 2009a). Estudos recentes sugerem que quando a qualidade dos mutuários é elevada (isto é, quando apresentam bons ratings), os bancos podem superar a assimetria de informação oferecendo um menu de contratos que prevê a prestação de garantias bancárias que agem como um dispositivo de triagem, mitigando os erros de “screening” e, consequentemente, o racionamento do crédito para as empresas rentáveis. Neste caso, os mutuários com risco elevado optam por escolher contratos com taxas de juro mais elevadas e garantias bancárias mais reduzidas, enquanto que os mutuários com maior qualidade creditícia optam por contratos mais exigentes do ponto de vista dos requisitos ao nível das garantias bancárias em troca de taxas de juro mais baixas (Han et al., 2009a). Assim, na negociação dos contratos de empréstimos bancários, as garantias bancárias assumem um papel fundamental como um instrumento de sinalização e gestão de riscos (Bonfim, 2005). O seu papel, no entanto, tem sido pouco estudado no contexto das finanças empresariais e foi validado, em particular, no contexto “market-based system” que oferece às PMEs uma ampla gama de fontes de financiamento (La Porta et al., 1998). Além disso, assume-se como plausível o argumento de que o papel das garantias bancárias varia entre países desenvolvidos e países menos desenvolvidos, em função dos diferentes níveis de assimetria de informação que se colocam à atividade bancária (Hainz, 2003; Menkhoff et al, 2012; Beck et al, 2006; Menkhoff et al., 2006). Simultaneamente, reconhece-se que a eficiência das garantias bancárias depende da natureza dos ativos usados para garantir o empréstimo, o que pressupõe uma análise cuidada e singular sobre o valor intrínseco das garantias bancárias reais versus garantias pessoais (Mann, 1997). As características das garantias bancárias dependem igualmente das características individuais do empréstimo e da própria empresa (Berger e Udell, 1998; Columba et al, 2010), bem como do enquadramento legal em caso de incumprimento (Zecchini e Ventura, 2009). Se as PMEs forem incapazes de prestar garantias bancárias, se estas apresentarem um curto historial de crédito, se adotarem políticas de reporte de informação financeira pouco rigorosas e se a informação pública sobre si mesmas for reduzida (Columba et al., 2010), ou mesmo se o sistema legal for insuficiente para proteger os direitos dos credores (Zecchini e Ventura, 2009), o seu acesso ao crédito bancário permanecerá restrito, especialmente em períodos de recessão económica, com efeitos negativos sobre a dinâmica da economia, a sua competitividade e crescimento (Beck e Demirgüc- Kunt, 2006). Neste contexto, em quase metade dos países em todo o mundo, vários tipos de fundos de garantia mútua foram criados com o objetivo de facilitar o acesso ao crédito bancário por parte das PMEs (Green, 2003; Gonzàles et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2010; Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010). A importância das garantias mútuas é cada vez mais relevante devido aos Acordos de Capital de Basileia II e III, na medida em que estas permitem, se concedidas em conformidade com alguns requisitos, mitigar a exposição ao risco de crédito associado aos empréstimos concedidos às PMEs, de tal forma que podem promover a atividade de concessão de crédito garantindo em simultâneo o cumprimento dos rácios regulamentares de capital (SPGM, 2007; Cardone-Riportella et al., 2008). Com efeito, nos últimos anos, a atribuição de garantias mútuas ganhou um novo impulso, especialmente nos países que compõem a Organização para a Cooperação Económica e para o Desenvolvimento (OECD),uma vez que, no âmbito da crise no setor financeiro internacional, estas têm sido o instrumento privilegiado para estender o crédito às PMEs sem comprometer os requisitos de capital dos bancos (Uesugi et al, 2010). Não obstante, a eficiência das garantias mútuas prestadas por uma terceira entidade enquanto instrumento promotor da concessão de empréstimos às PMEs é ainda uma questão controversa na literatura política e académica (Cowling, 2010; Honohan, 2010; Boschi et al,2014). Tradicionalmente, os académicos e os decisores políticos têm vindo a concentrar grande parte da sua atenção nas empresas que solicitam empréstimos bancários e, especificamente, no problema do racionamento de crédito, marginalizando as empresas que não apresentam pedidos de crédito bancário, mesmo quando admitem necessitar de algum tipo de empréstimo. Estas empresas são designadas de “mutuários desencorajados” (“Discouraged borrowers”) (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Kon and Storey, 2003). Apesar da base teórica de Kon e Storey (2003) para o "desencorajamento" ser, em princípio, aplicável a economias desenvolvidas e a economias em desenvolvimento, existem evidências empíricas que sugerem que o problema do desencorajamento de crédito é maior em países menos desenvolvidos (por exemplo, Chakravarty e Xiang, 2013; Brown et al, 2011; Cole e Dietrich, 2012). No entanto, a literatura empírica sobre este problema nos países menos desenvolvidos é ainda limitada oferecendo um terreno fértil no que diz respeito ao entendimento sobre a existência deste tipo de mutuários. Com base no enquadramento teórico e empírico, esta tese aborda, de forma crítica, algumas dimensões pouco exploradas sobre a atividade de crédito bancário especificamente direcionada ao financiamento das PMEs, tais como: a política de garantias bancárias (reais e pessoais); o papel de garantias mútuas e o desencorajamento da procura de crédito bancário. Com efeito, no primeiro capítulo desta tese examinamos o impacto simultâneo das características observadas e da informação privada sobre os termos do contrato de crédito bancário das PMEs, usando dados recolhidos entre janeiro de 2007 e dezembro de 2010 sobre a atividade bancária de um grande banco comercial a operar em Portugal. Usando uma configuração de dados multi-período, este capítulo fornece a primeira abordagem ao modelo “Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection” (SBSS) num contexto de “Bank-based System”. Para além disso, fornece evidências empíricas sobre o efeito das condições macroeconómicas sobre os termos dos contratos de crédito bancário durante o período de crise financeira e de recessão económica. Usando 12,666 pedidos de crédito aprovados, os principais resultados mostram que os mutuários com um bom rating estão mais dispostos a oferecer garantias bancárias em troca de uma redução percentual das taxas de juro, sabendo que têm uma elevada probabilidade de sucesso, não sendo, por isso, suscetíveis de entrar em incumprimento. Num processo interativo e sequencial, os resultados confirmam que os credores adequam os termos específicos do contrato de crédito em função das características observadas, aumentando quer os requisitos de garantias bancárias quer a taxa de juro para mutuários com maior risco observado, de acordo com o modelo SBSS proposto por Han et al (2009a). No entanto, rejeitamos a relação positiva entre o montante do empréstimo, prevista neste modelo, e o preço do crédito negociado. Neste capítulo, argumentamos que o montante do empréstimo diminui a probabilidade de prestar garantias bancárias reduzindo igualmente as taxas de juro exigidas para a obtenção do empréstimo, o que sugere que os empréstimos de maior montante aumentam o retorno potencial para os bancos e são atribuídos a mutuários com melhor qualidade creditícia. Em contrapartida, à medida que a maturidade dos empréstimos aumenta, torna-se cada vez mais provável que o credor exija garantias bancárias e taxas de juro mais elevadas, especialmente se o credor possui informações públicas negativas acerca do mutuário ou se a qualidade do mutuário do crédito não é observável, com o objetivo de reduzir o risco moral - “moral hazard” - e os riscos inerentes à substituição de ativos no período subsequente à concessão de crédito (“ex-post shifting behavior”) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Boot et al., 1991).Este capítulo mostra que estes resultados são robustos quando analisado o rácio de cobertura das garantias bancárias, reforçando as conclusões do modelo SBSS e contribuindo para ultrapassar as suas limitações empíricas sublinhada

Hardware accelerated real-time Linux video anonymizer

Dissertação de mestrado em Engenharia Eletrónica Industrial e ComputadoresOs Sistemas Embebidos estão presentes atualmente numa variada gama de equipamentos do quotidiano do ser humano. Desde TV-boxes, televisões, routers até ao indispensável telemóvel. O Sistema Operativo Linux, com a sua filosofia de distribuição ”one-size-fits-all” tornou-se uma alternativa viável, fornecendo um vasto suporte de hardware, técnicas de depuração, suporte dos protocolos de comunicação de rede, entre outros serviços, que se tornaram no conjunto standard de requisitos na maioria dos sistemas embebidos atuais. Este sistema operativo torna-se apelativo pela sua filosofia open-source que disponibiliza ao utilizador um vasto conjunto de bibliotecas de software que possibilitam o desenvolvimento num determinado domínio com maior celeridade e facilidade de integração de software complexo. Os algoritmos deMachine Learning são desenvolvidos para a automização de tarefas e estão presentes nas mais variadas tecnologias, desde o sistema de foco de imagem nosmartphone até ao sistema de deteção dos limites de faixa de rodagem de um sistema de condução autónoma. Estes são algoritmos que quando compilados para as plataformas de sistemas embebidos, resultam num esforço de processamento e de consumo de recursos, como o footprint de memória, que na maior parte dos casos supera em larga escala o conjunto de recursos disponíveis para a aplicação do sistema, sendo necessária a implementação de componentes que requerem maior poder de processamento através de elementos de hardware para garantir que as métricas tem porais sejam satisfeitas. Esta dissertação propõe-se, por isso, à criação de um sistema de anonimização de vídeo que adquire, processa e manipula as frames, com o intuito de garantir o anonimato, mesmo na transmissão. A sua implementação inclui técnicas de Deteção de Objectos, fazendo uso da combinação das tecnologias de aceleração por hardware: paralelização e execução em hardware especial izado. É proposta então uma implementação restringida tanto temporalmente como no consumo de recursos ao nível do hardware e software.Embedded Systems are currently present in a wide range of everyday equipment. From TV-boxes, televisions and routers to the indispensable smartphone. Linux Operating System, with its ”one-size-fits-all” distribution philosophy, has become a viable alternative, providing extensive support for hardware, debugging techniques, network com munication protocols, among other functionalities, which have become the standard set of re quirements in most modern embedded systems. This operating system is appealing due to its open-source philosophy, which provides the user with a vast set of software libraries that enable development in a given domain with greater speed and ease the integration of complex software. Machine Learning algorithms are developed to execute tasks autonomously, i.e., without human supervision, and are present in the most varied technologies, from the image focus system on the smartphone to the detection system of the lane limits of an autonomous driving system. These are algorithms that, when compiled for embedded systems platforms, require an ef fort to process and consume resources, such as the memory footprint, which in most cases far outweighs the set of resources available for the application of the system, requiring the imple mentation of components that need greater processing power through elements of hardware to ensure that the time metrics are satisfied. This dissertation proposes the creation of a video anonymization system that acquires, pro cesses, and manipulates the frames, in order to guarantee anonymity, even during the transmis sion. Its implementation includes Object Detection techniques, making use of the combination of hardware acceleration technologies: parallelization and execution in specialized hardware. An implementation is then proposed, restricted both in time and in resource consumption at hardware and software levels

The Impact of YouTube and TikTok Influencers in the Customer Journey: An Empirical Comparative Study Among Generation Z Users

Trabalho apresentado em 2022 International Conference on Marketing and Technologies (ICMarkTech’22), 1-3 dezembro 2022, Santiago de Compostela, EspanhaThe present paper aims to analyse the impact of YouTubers and TikTokers influencers in the customer journey phases, among Generation Z users. To do so, a quantitative deductive empirical study was carried out. The respective data collection was made via an online questionnaire survey, obtaining a valid sample of 529 participants. The results show that both type of influencers might influence the customer journey, but mainly in the first stages of the process. It was also found that YouTubers tend to have a higher influence in each of those stages than TikTokers. Although the topic of social media influencers is growing significantly and has already been studied, no similar study was found addressing separately the stages of the customer journey decision-making process, neither comparing influencer of both platforms in that contextN/